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leaving behind self-righTeousness: using
MuTual resPeCT and CoMProMise To solve
eMerging ConfliCTs beTween religious liberTy
and saMe-sex Marriage
Benjamin Issa1

F

or Jack Phillips, being a Protestant does not just mean going to
church on Sunday: his faith informs other parts of his life, including how he runs his business. At his Lakewood, Colorado,
bakery, he declines to make Halloween pastries that could promote
what he sees as satanic symbols, and he does not sell erotic pastries
that offend his sense of morality. So when a gay couple walked into
his business to purchase a wedding cake, it must have felt natural to
Mr. Phillips to respectfully decline that order. However, this led to a
legal conflict, and Mr. Phillips was ordered by the state civil rights
commission to retrain all of his employees—including his 87-yearold mother—and file regular reports to the state documenting any
incidents during which his bakery declined to provide service. While
his case makes its way through federal court, he has stopped accepting orders for wedding cakes.2
Several months after the incident at Mr. Phillips’s bakery, Collin
Dewberry and Kelly Williams—a gay couple—were kicked out of a
bar in Pittsburg, Texas, after one man kissed the other. The waitress
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instructed the couple not to come back and used gay slurs as the
couple left.3
When incidents like these occur, it can be emotional for both
parties. For business owners, these conflicts go to the very heart of
religious freedom. For same-sex couples, these incidents can be embarrassing and disheartening. For them, the issue is about equality—
an issue they must feel should have been resolved with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.
The public has become emotionally invested in these types of
questions as well. Some states and municipalities have begun to pass
laws designed to regulate these circumstances, including Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) laws4 and non-discrimination ordinances protecting lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)5
people.6 In most cases, participants in conversations about these laws
see only a binary choice: we can either protect religious freedom, or
we can protect the rights of same-sex individuals, but not both.7 That
view is understandable given the emotional nature of this conflict,
but it is incorrect. Conflicts between rights should not—and historically have not—lead us to simply disregard one side of the conflict.
3
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Regrettably, this binary view of the problem has also influenced legislators in state and local governments. Legislators and city officials
have tended to pass laws that protect either religious business owners
or gay couples. This is a mistake.
State and local governments should create nondiscrimination
ordinances that protect minorities and provide limited exceptions
for small-business owners who, in some cases, are being required
to participate in actions that violate their constitutionally protected
religious beliefs. For example, a law could protect both minorities
and the religious liberty of small-business owners by (1) allowing
small-business owners to decline service when providing the service
would require either creative expression or physical presence at the
event in question and the denial is not based solely on an immutable8
characteristic of the customer, and (2) requiring small-business owners
to serve the individual when the previous conditions are not fulfilled.

I. BACKGROUND
Although the debate surrounding gay marriage and non-discrimination ordinances is relatively new, this is not the first time the
United States has faced questions about the interaction between the
responsibility of federal, state, and local governments to protect citizens (from discrimination, harassment, etc.) and the individual liberties of citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution. In a republican
form of government that seeks to protect the rights of all citizens—
with all the nuance, variety, and individuality that each citizen has—
conflicts between rights are all but inevitable. However, rarely—if
ever—is the best answer to dismiss the arguments of one side out
of hand. Indeed, this is rarely the approach the United States takes
under constitutional law.
Even one of the most important non-discrimination laws in the
United States—the Fourteenth Amendment—is subject to some limitations. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, even when racial bias is
8
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involved, governments may discriminate if the discriminatory law
meets a “rigid scrutiny” standard—a compelling government interest and a narrowly tailored solution.9 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, discrimination based on gender requires a lower, but still
high, standard.10
Nearly all rights—constitutional or otherwise—are constrained
in some circumstances. Libel speech,11 threats,12 fighting words,13
and obscenity14 are all exceptions to the First Amendment right to
free speech.15 Some restrictions to the Second Amendment’s right
to keep and bear arms have been held to be constitutional.16 The
constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is
constrained when government officials have a search warrant17 and
does not prevent the government from collecting some metadata and
other general information about the electronic communications of
Americans in order to fight terrorism.18 This pattern of compromise
is not limited to rights directly enumerated in the Constitution. For
example, the right of a woman to have an abortion is limited to the
first trimester (or the point of “viability”).19
Unfortunately, in the current debate about non-discrimination
ordinances and religious liberty, both sides advocate for a solution
that favors only one side, often at the expense of another. Each side
9
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Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
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Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973).
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United States v. Xavier Alvarez 567 U.S. 2537, 2539 (2012).
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is apparently either unaware of or unconcerned with the repeated
pattern in our legal history of balancing—rather than choosing—
competing legitimate legal rights claims.

II. PROOF OF CLAIM
A. Grappling for Satisfactory Compromise with Religious Freedom
The United States’ tradition of thoughtful compromise in dilemmas between individual rights and protection against discrimination
has long been debated, specifically in issues of religious freedom.
In 1963, the Supreme Court’s decision in Sherbert v. Verner set the
standard upheld by the federal courts for the next several decades to
decide whether or not a law unconstitutionally violated a person’s
rights to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment.20 This
standard stipulates that laws substantially burdening an individual’s
free exercise of religion must serve a “compelling state interest” and
be narrowly tailored in order to be constitutionally permissible.21
This test is also called the “strict scrutiny” test. Beginning in 1980,
the Supreme Court began to issue a series of decisions that degraded
the power and use of the Sherbert test. The Sherbert test finally met
its end in 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith (also referred to as
Oregon v. Smith).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Smith, in which two Native
American citizens were denied unemployment benefits after being
fired for peyote use during a religious ceremony, was essentially
the death knell for the Sherbert test. Although the Oregon Supreme
Court had agreed with the Native American citizens22 on grounds
of the Sherbert test,23 the US Supreme Court overruled the decision
20

Karin M. Rebescher, Illusory Enforcement of First Amendment Freedom:
Employment Division, Department of Human Services v. Smith and the
Abandoning of the Compelling Government Interest Test, 69 N. Carolina
L.J. 1332, 1344–1345 (1991).

21

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).

22

Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990).
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by limiting the scope of the Sherbert test essentially to cases where
no violation of law occurred. Thus, Smith was no longer evaluated
under the Sherbert test and instead was subject to what was called
“hybrid-analysis”: a religiously neutral, generally applicable law
only unconstitutionally infringed on an individual’s right to freedom
of religion if in addition to the free exercise clause another constitutional right, such as freedom of speech or freedom of assembly, were
involved.24 This made the banning of peyote and denying unemployment benefits to the religiously invested Native Americans constitutionally permissible.25
Congress, with the support of then-President Bill Clinton, passed
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993.26 This created a statutory version of the Sherbert test after it became clear that
the American public strongly opposed the Supreme Court’s decision
in Smith.27 President Clinton joked that “The power of God is such
that even in the legislative process miracles can happen.”28 RFRA
barred the government from substantially burdening an individual’s
free exercise of religion unless the law in question furthered a compelling government interest and was tailored as narrowly as possible.29 In order to provide enforcement, the law required that
A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or

24

Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902 (1990).

25

Id. at 911

26

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C §§ 2000bb–
2000bb-4 (1993).

27
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(1991) (discussing the public reaction of religious coalition groups to the
decision)
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defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief
against a government.30
Although RFRA did not meet the same definitive end that the Sherbert test did, it was substantially weakened shortly after its passage.
In 1997, the Supreme Court issued a decision in City of Boerne v.
Flores that limited the applicability of RFRA by ruling that Congress had overstepped its authority.31 Although Congress was free
to restrict its own conduct by law, the Supreme Court concluded
that Congress had no right to tell federal courts how to interpret the
Constitution.32 Thus, the restrictions RFRA originally placed on all
federal, state, and municipal governments today apply only to Congress. State and municipal governments continue to be bound only
by the “hybrid rights” test established by Smith.33
So stands the state of religious liberty today: Congress, under
RFRA, imposed on itself a strict scrutiny standard. State and municipal governments, however, are bound only by the “hybrid rights
test” and may pass laws restricting religious liberty as long as those
laws are neutral, generally applicable, and are not the result of an effort to target one particular group.
B. The Conflict between Non-Discrimination and Religious Liberty
With the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Obergefell requiring states to allow same-sex couples to wed, the central questions
raised in these early religious liberty cases are becoming increasingly relevant. In conservative areas of the country, states and municipal governments are passing their own version of religious freedom
laws—laws that implicitly or explicitly give business owners the
right to refuse service on the basis of a potential customer’s sexual

30

Id. § 2000bb-1 (1993).

31

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997).

32

Id.

33

Id. at 513.
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orientation.34 Meanwhile, same-sex couples across the country are
fighting against what they see as immoral and illegal discrimination
by suing business owners who refuse them service.35
Both federal and state courts have ruled in a variety of such cases,
but a clear consensus has failed to emerge. Proponents for religious
business owners argue that American citizens who own businesses
should not be required to participate in actions they find morally
objectionable. Proponents for LGBT consumers argue that religious
rights do not and should not give someone the right to discriminate
in the market.36 Additional responsibilities come to business owners
when they freely choose to participate in the American economy and
when no one is required, proponents of non-discrimination argue, to
take on those responsibilities. Proponents for the couples also compare discrimination based on sexual orientation to discrimination
based on other immutable characteristics, such as race—which is
not a legal basis of discrimination in the United States, even when
motivated by religious beliefs.
Given this country’s history of oppressing minorities,37 advocates of non-discrimination ordinances can be forgiven for wondering whether the motivations for laws like RFRA are nothing more
than bigotry. However, that view misunderstands the fundamental
importance of religious liberty: the freedom to live according to our
religious beliefs is essential to human dignity. Undoubtedly there are
some motivated by bigotry who appeal to religious freedom as a way

34

Cities and Counties with Non-Discrimination Ordinances that Include
Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation, Human Rights Campaign http://
www.hrc.org/resources/cities-and-counties-with-non-discrimination-ordinances-that-include-gender (last visited Jan. 26, 2017).

35

LGBTQ Legal Advocates and Defenders, Our Work: Cases, https://www.
glad.org/our-impact/cases/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2017).
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Editorial Board, In Indiana, Using Religion as a Cover for Bigotry, N.Y.
Tɪᴍᴇꜱ, Mar. 31, 2015 at A24. Look specifically the final paragraph.

37

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health, Centers for Disease
Control http://www.cdc.gov/lgbthealth/youth.htm (last updated Nov. 12,
2014). Note the increased suicide rates the CDC has found for minorities
discussed in this article.
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to protect discriminatory behavior.38 Yet casting this debate as a conflict solely between minorities and insincere, discriminatory people
discredits the important role that free exercise of religion plays in
human society.
Many of these arguments talk past each other rather than engaging with each other, and both rely—as our national discourse
also tends to—on an all-or-nothing approach. With few exceptions,
states have engaged in little nuance and have simply created laws
that “pick” one side or the other. Some states have required all businesses to cater to all clients, regardless of the owner’s religious
beliefs. In some cases, state agencies charged with enforcing marketplace fairness have even reinterpreted existing state laws to give
themselves the authority to ban all discrimination based on sexual
orientation. In other states, poorly written RFRA laws diminish the
rights of LGBT people beyond what most social conservatives would
want—allowing religious business owners to fire employees because
of sexual orientation alone and allowing religious landlords to evict
tenants based solely on sexual orientation or gender identity.
C. Example Statutory Implementations
Utah’s anti-discrimination law is a rare example of a more nuanced approach to these types of issues.39 Passed in 2015, Utah’s law
is a compromise bill that incorporates the less controversial aspects
of RFRA laws and nondiscrimination laws. The law prevents workers from being fired or evicted based on sexual orientation or gender
identity, but it grants churches and comparable religious organizations and their subsidiaries an exemption from that requirement.40
The law also prevents individuals from being fired for expressing
conservative or liberal views on issues such as marriage and family
life. The state has a compelling interest to protect all individuals, including members of the LGBT community, from arbitrary or bad-faith
employment and housing practices. The law has narrowly tailored its
38

KTRK-TV, supra note 2.

39

S.B. 296, 61st Leg., 2015 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015).

40
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solution; it requires concessions of religious objectors only as necessary to achieve its goal.41
Critics of Utah’s law might point out that it doesn’t include protections for LGBT people in the private marketplace.42 For example,
an LGBT person could still be denied service at any store or place of
business simply because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. This is a legitimate criticism of Utah’s law. Allowing LGBT people access to the marketplace is certainly a compelling government
interest, and creating a law that is narrowly tailored to meet that goal
is certainly possible. For example, a law as outlined below would
protect the religious rights of religious business owners, while at the
same time narrowly tailoring those protections to only include circumstances where completely necessary. For example, the law could
allow religious business owners to deny someone service when
(a) The product or service in question requires the creation
of an artistic work or a piece of personal expression (a personalized wedding cake, wedding photography, and so on).
AND
(b) Providing the product or service would require physically being present at the location of the religiously objectionable act (catering a same-sex wedding on location).
OR
(c) The religious owner is denying service based on an action (same-sex marriage, gender reassignment surgery) as
opposed to an immutable characteristic (sexual orientation,
gender identity).
However, the law would also require religious business owners to
serve someone when
41

J. Stewart Adams, Fairness for All in a Post-Obergefell World: The Utah
Compromise Model, 4 Iʟʟɪɴᴏɪs L. Rev. 1651, 1657–1658 (2016).

42

Terri R. Day and Danielle Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini RFRA: A
Return to Separate But Equal, 65 DᴇPᴀᴜʟ L. Rᴇᴠ. 907 (2016).
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(a) The sole basis of the potential discrimination is an immutable characteristic (sexual orientation, gender identity).
OR
(b) The product or service does not require creative expression (a baker selling cupcakes that have already been made).
OR
(c) The product or service requires free expression, but the
free expression is not customized, personalized, or endorsing of the actions the business owner objects to (wedding
cakes are sold pre-made and are not specialized by the baker
for a same-sex couple nor made on demand for the couple).
Creating these narrow exceptions to non-discrimination ordinances
would preserve the religious rights of small businesses while allowing the government to fulfill its compelling interest of protecting
LGBT individuals from discrimination. The exceptions would protect the rights of LGBT people seeking to engage in the marketplace
in most circumstances, while protecting religious business owners
from participating in the specific objectionable act.
For example, if a gay couple patronized a small restaurant
owned by a religious family who objects to gay marriage, that restaurant would be required to serve them. However, if that couple
asks the restaurant to cater their wedding, the family could object on
the grounds that it would require them to participate and be present
at the specific objectionable act. Similarly, if a same-sex couple commissions a piece of art celebrating romantic same-sex couples, that
artist could likewise decline.

III. CONCLUSION
The solution proposed here—a non-discrimination ordinance
that would protect the religious rights of business owners in certain
circumstances—will impose a greater administrative burden than
the less complex alternative that is becoming increasingly common:
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a blanket ban on all discrimination based on sexual orientation.
However, our country’s history teaches us that this trade-off would
be worth it. Many of our country’s greatest successes, including the
Constitution itself, exist because men and women were willing to
drop an all-or-nothing approach that championed self-righteousness
and certainty in favor of an approach defined by compromise and
mutual respect. Taking an all-or-nothing approach to difficult issues
weakens our ability to find inventive solutions to difficult moral and
legal problems. The nature of culture wars is such that they trick us
into believing we have only a binary choice—that we must “choose
a side.” Such a mentality could lead someone to believe, erroneously,
that proponents of laws protecting the religious rights of business
owners are motivated primarily by bigotry or that proponents of
non-discrimination ordinances lack any respect for people of religious faith. Both views are mistaken. We can and must promote legislation that acknowledges the nuanced nature of this issue.

